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William Safire, On Media Giantism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at A19 (arguing that
“media mergers have narrowed the range of information and entertainment available to
people of all ideologies”).
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INTRODUCTION
The Communications Act of 19342 empowered the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) to issue licenses and enact
regulations in accordance with the “public interest, convenience, or
necessity.”3 Subsequently, the FCC and federal courts interpreted
the “public interest” standard as requiring the promotion of
competition, diversity, and localism in the radio marketplace.4
While these three goals have remained unchanged, the means of
trying to achieve them has evolved. The rise and fall of radio
ownership restrictions reflect these changing views.
The FCC began placing restrictions on radio ownership soon
after the Communications Act of 1934 in order to promote
diversity and protect against anti-competitive behavior that may

2

Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615 (2000)).
3
47 U.S.C. § 303.
4
See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (accepting the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) determination that the principles of competition
and localism fall within the scope of “public interest”); see also Fed. Communications
Comm’n [FCC] v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (holding
that the “public interest” standard encompasses the goal of providing the “widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources” (quoting AP v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)); infra notes 63–89 and accompanying text.

PRINDLE FORMAT

2003]

12/9/2003 2:34 PM

RADIO CONSOLIDATION AND DIMINISHED DIVERSITY

281

accompany large-scale consolidation.5 Likewise, the FCC cited
goals of promoting diversity and furthering competition when it
started loosening these very restrictions in the 1980s.6 This
apparent contradiction reflects a transformation in the philosophy
of the FCC from the theory that competition, diversity, and
localism are best protected through regulation, to the marketplace
theory.7 The marketplace theory suggests that deregulation spurs
more competition for listeners, thereby promoting the audience
interests of diversity and localism.8
The pinnacle of the marketplace theory and deregulation is
embodied in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,9 which severely
loosened local ownership restrictions and completely eliminated
the national ownership cap.10 Now, a single entity may own up to
eight stations in the largest markets and an unlimited amount
nationwide.11 As a result of these relaxed ownership restrictions,
the radio industry consolidated rapidly.12
5

See Michael J. Aguilar, Note, Micro Radio: A Small Step in The Return to Localism,
Diversity, and Competitiveness in Broadcasting, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1133, 1158 (1999)
(suggesting that the licensing of micro-radio stations could compensate for the recent
move away from localism, diversity, and competition). Initially, a person or entity with a
broadcasting license was prohibited from obtaining another license in the same broadcast
service, unless the applicant could demonstrate that the issuance would advance
competition and not result in concentration of control harmful to the public interest. Id.
In 1940, the FCC began setting absolute limits, restricting common ownership of FM
radio stations to six. Id. The FCC created national and local ownership restrictions in
order to “promote diversity of ownership . . . and to safeguard against the undue
concentration of economic power.” Id. (quoting Henry Geller, Ownership Regulatory
Policies in the U.S. Telecom Sectors, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 727, 729 (1995)).
6
See Benjamin J. Bates & Todd Chambers, The Economic Basis for Radio
Deregulation, 12 J. MEDIA ECONS. 19, 23 (1999) (evaluating the theories behind the trend
toward deregulation).
7
See id.; see also infra notes 121–124 and accompanying text.
8
Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 23.
9
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)).
10
47 U.S.C. § 202(a).
11
Id.
12
See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 29. For example, from March 1996 to
March 2002, the number of radio stations nationwide increased 5.4 percent, while the
number of owners decreased 33.6 percent. George Williams & Scott Roberts, Radio
Industry Review 2002: Trends in Ownership, Format, and Finance, FCC, at
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2003); see also infra
notes 180–96 and accompanying text.
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While the Telecommunications Act’s deregulation of
ownership restrictions undoubtedly caused this large-scale
consolidation, there is debate as to whether consolidation furthers
or restricts the public interest goals of promoting competition,
diversity, and localism.13 Critics of deregulation charge that
consolidation of radio ownership has resulted in a less competitive
marketplace, where diversity and localism suffer.14 On the other
hand, proponents maintain that consolidation allows for
operational efficiency and produces a superior, more diverse
product for listeners without harming competition.15
The debate over deregulation and resulting consolidation is
reviewed by the FCC every two years as required by the
Telecommunications Act.16
In the review, the FCC must
determine “whether any of such rules are necessary in the public
interest as a result of competition.”17 In September 2002, the FCC
initiated its third biennial review of its media ownership rules.18
As a result, on June 2, 2003, the FCC proposed further relaxation
of media ownership restrictions while leaving radio ownership
rules virtually unchanged.19
13

With the passage of the Telecommunications Act, the debate has moved out of
economic theory and into economic reality. See infra Part III.
14
Among the most vocal critics is the Future of Music Coalition, which produced a
scathing critique of the industry as moving away from the goals of localism, diversity,
and competition. See FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, RADIO DEREGULATION: HAS IT
SERVED
CITIZENS
AND
MUSICIANS?
24
(2002),
available
at
http://www.futureofmusic.org/research/radiostudy.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003); see
also infra Part III.
15
For example, money saved through operational efficiencies has led to new and
innovative products like voice-tracking, which allows big-city disc jockey talent to reach
smaller markets that otherwise would not be able to afford it. See Jeff Leeds, Clear
Channel: An Empire Built on Deregulation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at B1; see also
infra notes 150–64 and accompanying text.
16
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h).
17
Id.
18
See Press Release, FCC, FCC Initiates Third Biennial Review of Broadcast
Ownership Rules (Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter FCC Press Release], available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226188A1.doc (last visited Nov.
13, 2003).
19
Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Statutes of 2002
Biennial Regulatory Review, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003). The FCC’s decision
faced immediate opposition in Congress and the imposition of the new rules was stayed
by a federal court order. This overwhelming response—as well as the FCC’s decision to
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As part of the review process, the FCC adopted a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (“Notice”) on September 12, 2002.20 In the
Notice, the FCC affirmed its traditional goals of promoting the
three principles of public interest: competition, diversity, and
localism in the local media market.21 The FCC investigated
whether (1) the marketplace provided a sufficient level of
competition to protect and advance the above policy goals; (2) the
current ownership rules achieved these goals; and (3) the revisions
to the rules were required to protect and advance competition,
diversity, and localism in the media market.22
Part I of this Note discusses the early days of radio and the
need for regulation, including the creation of the FCC and the
passing of the Communications Act of 1934. It then examines the
interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934’s public interest
standard as encouraging competition, diversity, and localism
through radio ownership restrictions. Part II observes how the
marketplace theory and the benefits of economies of scale and
scope led the FCC and Congress to move from favoring regulation
to viewing deregulation as the best means to promote these three
public interest principles, culminating in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. Part III examines the resulting consolidation of radio
ownership and explores how deregulation of ownership restrictions
impedes the “public interests” of competition, diversity, and
localism in the radio marketplace. Part IV concludes that the
current radio marketplace does not provide sufficient competition
to protect and advance the goals of diversity and localism. It
advocates that the FCC retain local ownership restrictions and reevaluate a national ownership cap, as well as calls upon Congress
to curb current anti-competitive behavior.

avoid further radio deregulation—is likely the direct result of deregulation’s adverse
effect on the radio industry. See infra notes 166–76.
20
See FCC Press Release, supra note 18.
21
See id.
22
See id. The FCC chairman, Michael Powell, reportedly likes to say, “The market is
my religion.” Safire, supra note 1.
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I. REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD
A. Early Radio and Regulation
Radio began as little more than a utilitarian device, functioning
primarily to increase safety on ships and as a tool for government
and businesses to transmit information more efficiently.23 The first
federal regulation of radio emphasized its utility as a safety device,
requiring certain ocean-going vessels be equipped with radio
equipment managed by a skilled operator, so that the operator
would be able to promptly notify persons on shore and in other
nearby vessels if an emergency arose.24 In addition, radio enabled
U.S. Navy personnel to coordinate entire fleets and receive
weather reports and storm warnings.25 Radio also gave some
businesses a competitive advantage by allowing them to operate
more efficiently.26 For example, rather than having its ships stop
in ports to pick up telegraph messages, the United Fruit Company
used radio to direct its ships to the best markets.27
Government and business use of radio, however, soon
conflicted with amateur radio operators, who interfered with
official broadcasts and crowded out naval and business
communications.28 A few agitators even posed as admirals and
issued phony orders to naval ships.29
In response, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1912,
forbidding radio broadcast without a license and giving the
23

Michael Ortner, Note, Serving a Different Master—The Decline of Diversity and the
Public Interest in American Radio in the Wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 139, 140 (2000).
24
Wireless Ship Act of June 14, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-262, 36 Stat. 629 (1910)
(codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 484–87) (repealed 1934).
25
ANN E. WEISS, TUNE IN, TUNE OUT: BROADCASTING REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 12 (1981) (“It did not take navy officers long to see how useful it would be to
have ships linked to each other, and to shore, by wireless.”).
26
See id.
27
Id. (“Thanks to radio, they could receive that information while at sea. This gave
them an edge over competitors, and helped boost United Fruit profits.”).
28
Id.
29
Id. “Government officials soon made up their minds that such frivolous uses of radio
must be stopped, and in 1912 Congress passed the nation’s first radio law,” the Radio Act
of 1912. Id.
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Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor the power to
determine who could broadcast on specific frequencies at specific
times.30 The statute also allocated certain frequencies for exclusive
government use.31
Although nearly 9,000 Americans had
broadcast licenses by 1917,32 interference was rare because there
were more than enough frequencies for all the stations then in
existence.33
World War I accelerated the development of radio.34 The early
1920s brought the first standard broadcasting stations with
scheduled programming.35 By 1923, several hundred stations were
broadcasting across the country,36 and in 1924 Americans spent
$358 million on radio sets and parts.37 To deal with the rapid
growth in radio stations and resulting frequency interference,
“then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover called for a series of
national radio conferences.”38 In each year of the early 1920s the
industry called for the government to step in.39 In May of 1923,
Hoover announced a major reallocation of radio frequencies.40
30

Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912). This statute was also largely in
response to the Titanic disaster of April 14, 1912. See KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 52 (4th ed. 2003).
31
Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287.
32
WEISS, supra note 25, at 14.
33
See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210 (1943).
34
See id. The Navy gave contracts to the Westinghouse Corp., the General Electric
Corp. (GE), and the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T) to produce radio
parts and equipment during World War I. Each company made vast improvements and
obtained patents. Westinghouse Corp., GE, and AT&T, along with the United Fruit Co.,
united to create a company to use their more than two thousand patents to their best
advantage. The company, later broken up by the federal government, was called the
Radio Corp. of America (RCA). WEISS, supra note 25, at 14–15.
35
See NBC, 319 U.S. at 211
36
Id.
37
WEISS, supra note 25, at 18. The $358 million spent by Americans on radio sets and
parts in 1924 is a significant increase from the $60 million spent on radio sets and parts in
1920. Id.
38
Ortner, supra note 23, at 141. Meanwhile, both licensed and unlicensed broadcasters
continued to broadcast any material at any time and on any wavelength, causing “the
radio landscape [to become] so cluttered with interference and conflicting information
that the public was fortunate to find any sustained, palatable programming.” Id.
39
CREECH, supra note 30, at 53. “Everyone, it seemed, conservative and liberal alike,
was extolling the need for more regulation.” Ortner, supra note 23, at 142.
40
NBC, 319 U.S. at 211. Herbert Hoover’s decision was based on the recommendation
of the National Radio Conferences. Id.
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Hoover divided the frequencies into three classes and assigned
them to particular stations.41 The third class of frequencies
included stations that served small local areas, were on the same
spot on the dial, and had to share time.42 The second class
included stations that were a little larger and had to share time and
frequencies as necessary.43 The first class of frequencies carried
little interference, broadcast over wide areas, and had almost no
time-sharing.44 This most powerful class of radio stations was
called “clear channels.”45
These measures proved insufficient in the face of the
astonishing development of radio.46 At the Third National Radio
Conference in 1924, Hoover responded to the radio industry’s calls
for regulation by noting that radio “is probably the only industry of
the United States that is unanimously in favor of having itself
regulated.”47 More than 400 broadcasters attended the final
National Radio Conference in November of 1925.48 They opposed
accommodating new stations through extending the standard
broadcast band at the expense of other types of services or by
imposing greater limitations on time and power, and instead called
upon Congress to find a legislative solution.49

41

WEISS, supra note 25, at 27.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. Appropriately, the most powerful radio owner is named Clear Channel
Communications, with over 1,200 radio stations, the nation’s largest live-concert
promotions firm, 19 television stations and 770,000 billboards. Leeds, supra note 15.
46
See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943). Every channel in the standard
broadcast band was occupied by at least one station, and there were 175 applications for
new stations. Id. In order to accommodate the new stations, Hoover could either extend
the standard broadcast band at the expense of other services or impose even greater
limitations on time and power. Id.
47
ERWIN G. KRASNOW & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST
REGULATION 11 (3d ed. 1982). “The industry had come to demand such controls as the
increase in stations continued unchecked . . . . With every channel filled in urban areas,
most stations were experiencing considerable interference from other stations and had
been forced to work out complex time-sharing schemes.” Id.
48
CREECH, supra note 30, at 52. Only twenty-two broadcasters attended the First
National Radio Conference in 1922. Id.
49
See NBC, 319 U.S. at 211–12.
42
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Hoover’s hands were tied. In 1926, a U.S. federal court ruled
that the Radio Act of 1912 did not give the Secretary of Commerce
the right to allocate radio frequencies.50 The court declared all of
Hoover’s new assignments invalid.51 Months later, Acting
Attorney General William Donovan released an opinion stating
that the Secretary of Commerce had no authority, under the Radio
Act of 1912, to regulate the power, frequency, or hours of
operation of the radio stations.52 The next day, the Secretary of
Commerce issued a statement urging the stations to undertake selfregulation.53 Instead of self-regulating, however, station owners
began broadcasting wherever and whenever they pleased, resulting
in pandemonium.54
Amid the chaos, Congress responded to the demands of both
courts and station owners by enacting the Radio Act of 1927.55
The act created a “unified and comprehensive regulatory system
for the [radio] industry.”56 The statute took radio-licensing power
away from the Department of Commerce and gave it to a newly
formed five-member Federal Radio Commission (“FRC”).57 The
50

United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (finding “no
express grant of power in the act to the Secretary of Commerce to establish regulations”).
Zenith Radio Corp. was licensed to operate WJAZ on a frequency of 930 kHz for only
two hours per week, as part of Hoover’s solution to overcrowding. CREECH, supra note
30, at 53. Zenith then applied for a license to broadcast on 910 kHz, but—under an
agreement between the United States and Canada—the frequency was limited to
Canadian use. Id. Zenith rebelliously jumped to 910 kHz without a license, prompting
other stations to declare similar intentions. Id. Siding with Zenith, the court found that
the U.S. Commerce Department had no authority to establish radio regulations under the
Radio Act of 1912. Zenith, 12 F.2d at 614.
51
Id. at 618.
52
35 Op. Att’y. Gen. 126, 135 (1926) (advising Hoover that “[i]f the present situation
requires control, I can only suggest that it be sought in new legislation, carefully adapted
to meet the needs of both the present and future”).
53
NBC, 319 U.S. at 212.
54
See id. “With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.” Id.
55
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 81–121) (repealed 1934). Even President Calvin Coolidge had appealed to Congress
to pass legislation that would respond to the diminishing authority of the Department of
Commerce, noting that “the whole service of this most important public function has
drifted into such chaos as seems likely, if not remedied, to destroy its great value.” NBC,
319 U.S. at 213 (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 483, at 10 (2d Sess. 1926)).
56
NBC, 319 U.S. at 214.
57
Radio Act of 1927 § 3.
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statute specifically gave the FRC the authority to assign
frequencies and to regulate broadcasting hours, time-sharing, and
general use of the airwaves.58 Significantly, Congress mandated
that the standard for licensing radio stations was that the
broadcaster’s goals served the “public interest, convenience, or
necessity” of the people in the local broadcast market.59
Congress updated the 1927 law with the Communications Act
of 1934.60 This statute replaced the FRC with a seven-member
FCC and delegated regulation of both the telephone and telegraph
industries to the FCC.61 The Communications Act of 1934
retained the Radio Act of 1927’s requirements that: (1) stations be
licensed by a government agency; (2) licenses be of a definite and
temporary duration; and (3) licenses be granted in accordance with
the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.”62

58
Id. § 4.
The FRC faced virtually insuperable problems: its temporary status, with powers expiring
after one year; the danger of internal strife, because of each Commissioner’s appointment
from a geographical zone; the great vagueness of the act and the lack of a specific
mandate from Congress; the slowness of Senate confirmation of the Commissioners;
constant court challenges to its decisions; and the claim of ‘prior rights’ by stations
already on the air.
KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 47, at 13.
59
Id. § 4. The phrase “public interest, convenience, or necessity” originated in an
1887 Illinois railroad statute and resurfaced in the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41
Stat. 456 (1920). CREECH, supra note 30, at 55.
60
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615 (2000)). The objectives of the 1934 legislation remained
substantially unchanged from the goals of the Radio Act of 1927: to regulate the use—not
ownership—of radio frequencies in order to allow “a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and
world-wide communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.” NBC,
319 U.S. at 214.
61
Communications Act of 1934 § 4. Today, the FCC regulates television, too. The
FCC began formal operations on July 11, 1934. CREECH, supra note 30, at 55.
In 1982, Congress reduced the number of members to five. Commissioners are appointed
by the president, confirmed by the Senate and serve five-year terms. . . . [N]o more than
three members may be from the same political party and terms are staggered so that no
two terms expire in the same year. . . . The chairperson of the FCC is chosen by the
president and is responsible for setting the agenda of the FCC.
Id. at 8.
62
Communications Act of 1934 § 303.
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B. Defining Public Interest: Competition, Diversity, and Localism
Congress did not define the “public interest, convenience, or
necessity” in the Communications Act of 1934.63 Courts, however,
have granted the FCC wide latitude in determining what is in the
public interest.64 Courts have repeatedly held that the authority
conferred upon the FCC by Congress supplies a statutory basis for
the FCC to issue regulations codifying “its view of the publicinterest licensing standard.”65 The FCC’s regulations reveal the its
view of the public interest standard to be the promotion of
competition, diversity, and localism in the marketplace.66 Courts
endorsed this standard by repeatedly upholding regulations as
consistent with the statutory scheme of advancing the public
interest, as well as establishing the concept that the public interest
is superior to the private interests of the licensee.
In NBC v. United States,67 the Supreme Court accepted the
FCC’s determination that the principles of competition and
localism fell within the scope of public interest.68 Thus, the Court
dismissed a challenge to the FCC’s Chain Broadcasting
Regulations, which prohibited local stations from entering into
network affiliation contracts that resulted in the station
surrendering control of its programming to a network.69 The FCC
felt that the exclusive affiliation of the station impeded competition
63

See id.
See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953) (holding that the
FCC is not required to make specific findings of tangible benefit when concluding that
duplicating authorizations are not in the public interest).
65
See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broad., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956) (sustaining
regulations placing limits on the total number of stations a single entity could own in
each broadcast service based on the FCC’s policy of promoting diversification of
ownership); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978)
(upholding regulations governing the permissibility of common ownership of a radio or
television broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community based
on the FCC’s policy of promoting diversification of mass media).
66
See cases cited supra note 65.
67
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
68
Id. “Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was based
upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority granted by
Congress. It is not for us to say that the ‘public interest’ will be furthered or retarded by
the Chain Broadcasting Regulations.” Id. at 224.
69
Id.
64
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by hindering the growth of new networks.70 Also, the principle of
localism—or local program service—suffered when a station
broadcast a high percentage of its programming from a national
network.71 Calling local program service a “vital part of
community life,” the FCC determined that a licensee must
maintain freedom of action to service the programming and
advertising needs of the local community.72 The Court noted “an
important element of public interest and convenience affecting the
issue of a license is the ability of the licensee to render the best
practicable service to the community reached by [its]
broadcasts.”73 Significantly, the Court left it to the FCC to
determine the “best practicable service,” which reflects the
deference that most courts give to the FCC in determining how to
serve the public interest.74
Likewise, in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting,75 the Supreme Court resolved that the public interest
standard encompasses the policy goal of the “widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources.”76 The Court upheld regulations governing common
ownership of radio or television stations and newspapers in the
same community, concluding that the FCC’s determination that
diversification of mass media would benefit the public interest was
consistent with the Communications Act of 1934.77
Furthermore, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,78 the
Supreme Court held that the FCC’s interest in enhancing broadcast
diversity was a sufficient basis for upholding minority ownership
policies aimed at promoting programming variety.79 According to
70

Id. at 199.
Id. at 203.
72
Id. at 202.
73
Id. at 216 (quoting FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)).
74
Id.; see, e.g., FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978);
United States v. Storer Broad., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956); FCC v. RCA Communications,
Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953).
75
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
76
Id. at 785.
77
Id. at 795.
78
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
79
Id. at 567–68.
71
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the Court, the public benefited by having access to a wider
diversity of information sources.80 Thus, the FCC properly placed
diversity within the scope of the public interest standard.81
Recently, it has not been sufficient for the FCC to merely opine
that certain regulations would promote the public interest goals of
competition, diversity, and localism in the radio market. In Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,82 a federal court demanded that
the FCC illustrate valid reasons why regulations would promote
the public interest.83 The court noted that protecting diversity
remains a permissible policy, but observed that the FCC failed to
demonstrate any reason why national television ownership and
cable/broadcast cross-ownership rules would encourage
competition and diversity.84 Thus, while the promotion of
competition, diversity, and localism remains within the scope of
public interest, the FCC must also show how regulations might
actually promote these policy goals.
As courts have sanctioned the FCC’s definition of the public
interest standard as promoting competition, diversity, and localism
in the radio market, courts also have reiterated the concept that the
ownership rights of the public outweigh the licensee rights of the
broadcaster.85 The Communications Act of 1934 provides only for
the use of radio channels, “but not the ownership thereof.”86
Clearly, the licensee is merely a fiduciary for the public.87 In Red
80
Id. at 568. “From its inception, public regulation of broadcasting has been premised
on the assumption that diversification of ownership will broaden the range of
programming available to the broadcast audience.” Id. at 570.
81
See id.
82
280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
83
Id. at 1043.
84
Id. “Although we agree with the Commission that protecting diversity is a
permissible policy, the Commission did not provide an adequate basis for believing the
[National Television Station Ownership] Rule would in fact further that cause.” Id.
85
See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding regulations
requiring radio stations to provide time for a response to a personal attack).
86
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 301, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615 (2000)).
87
See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389 (“There is nothing in the First Amendment which
prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and
to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by
necessity, be barred from the airwaves.”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
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Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,88 the Supreme Court reminded that
“[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount.”89 According to the Court,
public interest is superior to private benefit.
Through regulations the FCC has defined the public interest
standard of the Communications Act of 1934 as promoting
competition, diversity, and localism in the radio market. Courts
have endorsed this interpretation and recently demanded evidence
that regulations would advance these principles. Although the
standard has remained unchanged, the FCC’s philosophy of the
most effective means of reaching the public interest goals has
shifted from regulatory to free market.
C. Ownership Regulations in the Public Interest
Soon after the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, the
FCC believed that regulating local and national radio ownership
was the best method of promoting competition, diversity, and
localism in the radio market.90 Thus, the FCC began placing limits
on radio ownership “to encourage diversity of ownership in order
to foster the expression of varied viewpoints and programming,
and to safeguard against undue concentration of economic
power.”91 The concern that unlimited ownership would cause
harmful concentration of economic power is reflected throughout

364, 377 (1984) (“[T]hose who are granted a license to broadcast must serve in a sense as
fiduciaries for the public.”).
88
395 U.S. 367.
89
Id. at 390.
90
See In re Matter of Review of the Commission’s Regs. Governing Television Broad.,
10 FCC Rcd. 3524, 3527 (1995). The earliest ownership rules “prohibited the issuance of
a license to anyone already possessing a license in the same broadcast service unless the
applicant could demonstrate that the [second] license would have a pro-competitive
impact and would not result in the concentration of control . . . inconsistent with the
public interest.” Id. at 3526–27.
91
Id. at 563.
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the early ownership regulations,92 in stark contrast to the FCC’s
adoption of a free market philosophy during recent deregulation.93
In 1940, the limit on the national common ownership of FM
radio stations was six.94 In 1946, the de facto limit on the national
common ownership of AM radio stations was seven, after the FCC
denied the application of CBS for an eighth station.95 In its
decision, the FCC determined that “[it was] against the public
interest to permit a concentration of control of broadcasting
facilities in any single person or organization.”96 In 1953, the FCC
adopted national multiple ownership rules that limited the common
ownership of radio stations to seven AM and seven FM.97
On a local level, the FCC regulated duopolies, the common
ownership of multiple radio stations in the same service (AM or
FM) in a particular community.98 In 1938, the FCC utilized the
“diversification of service” rationale when adopting a strong
presumption against granting licenses that would result in
duopolies.99 That is, the FCC believed that the greater the number
of separately owned outlets, the greater the promotion of the public
interest of diversity.100 Accordingly, the FCC prohibited FM
duopolies in 1940 and AM duopolies in 1943.101
The national and local ownership rules remained substantially
unchanged until the early 1980s, when the FCC began to

92

See, e.g., Sherwood B. Brunton, 11 F.C.C. 407, 413 (1946) (“[I]t’s against the public
interest to permit a concentration of control of broadcasting facilities in any single person
or organization.”).
93
The free market philosophy—marketplace theory—as applied to the radio industry
suggests that deregulation spurs more competition for listeners, thereby promoting the
audience interests of diversity and localism. See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 23;
see also infra notes 106–33 and accompanying text.
94
Rules Governing High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384
(1940).
95
Brunton, 11 F.C.C. at 413.
96
Id.
97
Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 9 Fed. Reg. 1563 (1953).
98
See In re Matter of Review of the Commission’s Regs. Governing Television Broad.,
10 FCC Rcd. 3524, 3528 (1995).
99
See id.
100
See id.
101
See id.
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deregulate.102 Although the FCC still defined the public interest as
promoting competition, diversity, and local ownership, the FCC no
longer saw ownership regulations as the best means of achieving
these goals.103 Instead, the FCC embraced the marketplace theory,
which suggests that an increase in stations would spur competition
and encourage the principles of diversity and localism as station
owners compete for audience.104 Thus far, the peak of radio
deregulation is the Telecommunications Act of 1996.105
II. DEREGULATION AND THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 relaxed local radio
ownership restrictions and eliminated the national ownership
cap.106 A single entity can now own up to eight radio stations in
the largest markets.107 Congress intended this amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934 to spur competition in the radio
market, which, in turn, would promote service to narrower
segments of the community and increase diversity and localism.108
102

This was part of a nationwide trend of deregulation—or regulatory reform—begun
during the Ford administration and continuing through the Reagan era. “Deregulation . . .
sought to protect the public interest by commercial competition, rather than by regulatory
defense of the ‘public interest.’” JEREMY TUNSTALL, COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION:
THE UNLEASHING OF AMERICA’S COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 3 (1986); see also infra
notes 109–49 and accompanying text.
103
See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 23. This “represented the policy shift from
the trusteeship model (where it was difficult for the government to define the public
interest), to the marketplace model (where the industry would rely on market forces to
determine the public interest).” Id.
104
Id.
105
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)).
106
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(a).
107
Id. In markets with greater than 45 stations, one entity may own up to 8 stations with
no more than 5 in one service (AM or FM); in markets with between 30 and 44 stations,
one entity may own up to 7 stations with no more than 4 in one service; in markets with
between 1,529 stations, one entity may own up to 6 stations with no more than 4 in one
service; in markets with up to 14 stations, one entity may own up to 5 stations with no
more than 3 in one service, as long as the entity does not own more than 50 percent of the
stations in the market. Id.
108
See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 24. The new ownership rules provide
“incentives for the development of market power within local radio markets by allowing
owners to consolidate or cluster groups of stations . . . .” Id. at 25.
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its massive deregulation
represent the FCC’s ideological shift from attempting to advance
the public interest through regulation to pursuing the public
interest in a deregulated marketplace.
The shift to deregulation began in the 1980s, when the FCC
began relaxing radio ownership limits.109 When it raised the
ownership ceiling to twelve AM and twelve FM stations nationally
in 1984, “the FCC maintained that diversity was an important
consideration.”110 By 1992, a single owner could acquire up to
two AM and two FM stations in markets with at least fifteen
stations, as long as the combined audience did not exceed twentyfive percent.111 In markets with less than fifteen stations, a single
owner could own up to three stations, provided that no more than
two were in the same service (AM or FM) and that the stations
represented less than half of the total number of stations in the
market.112 Nationwide, no more than forty stations could be
owned by a single entity.113
By the mid-1990s, many complained that the Communications
Act of 1934 was outdated and unable to effectively regulate
communications in a world with new technologies such as cable
and satellite television, the Internet, and cellular.114 Congress

109

See id. at 23.
See Aguilar, supra note 5 at 1159. However, “the FCC did not want the objective of
diversity to work to exclude the benefits of group ownership.” Id. at 1159 n.234.
111
Richard E. Wiley, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW
1996, at 7, 14 (Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course,
Handbook Series No. 461, 1996) (arguing that the Telecommunications Act of 1996
“address[es] the realities of today’s converging communications marketplace by
eliminating legal barriers that inhibit or preclude the entry of new competitors”).
112
Id. at 44.
113
In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 9 FCC Rcd 7183 (1994). The FCC
revised the national limits to increase the cap for minority owners to twenty-five FM
stations and twenty-five AM stations. Id.
114
See Ortner, supra note 23, at 146. President Clinton, when signing the 1996 act into
law, remarked: “this revolution has been held back by outdated laws designed for a time
when there was one phone company, three TV networks, no such thing as a personal
computer. Today with the stroke of a pen our laws will catch up with our future.” Id. at
146 n.37 (quoting Federal News Service, Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Vice
President Al Gore at the Signing of the Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996 (Feb. 9,
1996)).
110
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agreed and passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996.115
Although much attention went to the restrictions that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 lifted from the common carriers
and cable companies, the new legislation lifting restrictions on
radio station ownership received relatively little attention.116
The FCC, however, determined that the public interest
principles of competition, diversity, and localism were best served
through deregulation of ownership restrictions.117 Proponents of
deregulation agreed with this marketplace theory, advocating that
fewer restrictions would improve competition, as well as allow
companies to benefit from the efficiencies found with large-scale
consolidation.118 Meanwhile, critics of deregulation argued that
loosening the ownership restrictions would actually stifle
competition, causing diversity and localism to suffer.119

115

Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)). The
law passed by a vote of 414 to 16 in the House of Representatives, and a vote of 91 to 5
in the Senate. Wiley, supra note 111, at 16 n.1.
116
See Ortner, supra note 23, at 146 (opining that the lack of attention mirrored the lack
of understanding that radio—unlike television and common carriers—still has a ceiling
on the number of available options).
117
See In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), stating:
[P]olicies that may have been necessary in the early days of radio may not be
necessary in an environment where thousands of licensees offer diverse sorts of
programming and appeal to all manner of segmented audiences . . . . We
believe that given conditions in the radio industry, it is time to heed that
sentiment and to reduce the regulatory role played by Commission policies and
rules, and to permit the discipline of the marketplace to play a more prominent
role. It is our conclusion that the regulations that we are retaining and the
functioning of the marketplace will result in service in the public interest that is
more adaptable to changes in consumer preferences and at less financial cost
and with less regulatory burden.
118
See, e.g., Robert B. Ekelund et al., Market Power in Radio Markets: An Empirical
Analysis of Local and National Concentration, 43 J.L. & ECON. 157, 158 (2000)
(contending that empirical analysis of increased concentration shows increased
efficiency); see also infra notes 122–63 and accompanying text.
119
See, e.g., Jill Howard, Congress Errs in Deregulating Broadcast Ownership Caps:
More Monopolies, Less Localism, Decreased Diversity and Violations of Equal
Protection, 5 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 269, 278 (1997) (arguing that deregulation of
ownership restrictions destroys broadcasting ideals); see also infra notes 134–43 and
accompanying text.
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Furthermore, any efficiencies that benefit private interests are
inferior to the public interest.120
A. The Marketplace Theory: Serving the Public Interest
Economics—specifically the marketplace theory—provided the
foundation for the deregulation movement of the 1970s and 1980s,
as the government dissolved regulatory bodies that set prices and
routes for airlines, trucks, and railroads.121 The marketplace
approach to broadcast regulation proposes that a marketplace
without ownership restrictions serves the public interest by
creating a competitive environment.122 Increased competition
promotes diversity and localism in programming as stations seek
out specific niche markets to gain the greatest audience share.123
Thus, the public interest principles of competition, diversity, and
localism can be achieved through deregulation of ownership
restrictions.124
The theory that competition would increase is directly related
to the expansion of radio from 583 stations in 1934125 to over
10,000 today.126 The increase in the number of stations, combined
with the evolution of cable and the Internet, has made the industry

120

See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (“It is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”).
121
ROBERT COOTER, LAW & ECONOMICS 3 (4th ed. 2003). “Much of the impetus for
‘deregulation’ has come from the realization that much government activity concerns
private goods where markets should be lubricated, rather than government intruding
directly in the process of allocation.” Id. at 109. One unexpected difficulty was that
many industry spokespersons initially opposed to regulation found themselves against
deregulation, as old regulations became “woven securely into the fabric of the
economy . . . . What first looked like a straightjacket now felt more like an old tweed
suit.” Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Regulatory Lessons from the Reagan Era:
Introduction, in REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 3, at 7. (Meiners & Yandle eds., 1989).
122
See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 24.
123
See id. at 24. “[T]he competition for audience would ensure that audience interests
were served.” Id. at 23.
124
See id. at 23 (noting that this position “embodies a shift in the definition of public
interest from something determined by regulators to something determined by the
marketplace”).
125
See In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
126
Williams & Roberts, supra note 12.
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more competitive.127 Thus, proponents of the marketplace theory
argue that there is no longer a need for regulations to create
competition.128 In most markets, there are enough stations and
competition among them that relaxed ownership restrictions would
allow market forces to ensure that stations operate in the public
interest.129 Hence, the FCC argued that the radio marketplace
would provide a better and more responsive public interest control
mechanism than governmental regulations designed to monitor
programming decisions.130
According to the marketplace theory, a deregulated radio
marketplace furthers the public interests of diversity and
localism.131 Diversity is achieved by different profit-minded
broadcasters competitively seeking out and serving targeted
audiences.132 As the number of stations increases, there is a
greater likelihood that minority and niche audiences are served.133
Likewise, listeners who prefer a station that has local programming
would create a market for localism.
The marketplace theory is premised on sufficient
competition.134 Critics contend that this fundamental assumption
underlying deregulation is flawed.135 They argue that there may
not be sufficient competition and, consequently, market forces
would not compel operation in the public interest.136 The
assumption that competition would increase through deregulation
is speculative, and there is little supporting evidence.137 Given the
lack of evidence, critics point out, deregulation should be pursued

127

See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 23.
See id. at 20.
129
See id.
130
See In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
131
See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 24.
132
See id.
133
See id.
134
See id. at 20.
135
See id.
136
See id.
137
See Harvey J. Levin, U.S. Broadcast Deregulation: A Case of Dubious Evidence, 36
J. COMM. 25 (1986).
128
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in moderation.138 Abrupt deregulation may result in large-scale
consolidation and anti-competitive behavior, which would harm
the public interest.139
Critics of deregulation also dispute the contention that
increased competition would promote diversity.140 Even if there is
sufficient competition, instead of monopolistic behavior, there is
no evidence that stations would actually provide service to all of
the niche groups without regulations.141 For example, television’s
Public Broadcasting Service (“PBS”) has programming that is
widely recognized to be cultural, informational, and educational,
but “often has audiences so small as to be nonratable by the
established ratings services.”142 A station seemingly has no
monetary incentive to reach out to such a small listener
Furthermore, with relaxed local ownership
audience.143
restrictions, it is difficult to explain why a single entity owning
upwards of eight stations in the largest markets would reach out to
the smallest groups without the government telling them to do so.
To the contrary, economist Peter O. Steiner theorized that
relaxed ownership regulations would result in increased
programming diversity even in markets where a single entity
owned multiple stations.144 A single entity owning multiple
stations in a single market would not want to compete with itself
for the same group of listeners.145 Thus, the owner would program
the multiple stations in various ways to appeal to a variety of

138

See Howard, supra note 119, at 278 (stating that “it is a presumptive leap of logic . . .
to conclude that increased competition warrants complete abandonment of national
ownership caps which have existed for over half a century”).
139
See id.
140
See, e.g., Aguilar, supra note 5, at 1164 (arguing that the Telecommunications Act
has caused the broadcast industry to stray from the goals of localism, diversity, and
competitiveness).
141
See Levin, supra note 137, at 29.
142
Id.
143
See id.
144
Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of
Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. ECON. 194 (1952) (theorizing that increased
ownership concentration on the local level would lead to a subsequent increase in formats
in order to reach more listeners).
145
Id. at 212.
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listeners.146 In contrast, multiple owners of single stations in the
same market may all compete against each other within the same
format, targeting the same group of listeners.147
Steiner, however, concluded that, although competition
generally leads to greater diversity, markets with limited numbers
of stations and barriers to entry would lead to program duplication
which would not serve the public interest of diverse
programming.148 Thus, consolidation could be harmful to smaller
markets and markets with existing anti-competitive behavior.149
Once again, sufficient competition within a marketplace proves to
be the foundation necessary to ensure diverse programming.
The marketplace theory and corresponding deregulation of
ownership restrictions look to the market to promote the public
interest. The theory only works, however, within a genuine
competitive marketplace. Without competition, there is minimal
incentive to act in the public interest.
B. Economies of Scale and Scope: Serving the Private Interest
Deregulation of ownership restrictions should serve the public
interest, according to marketplace theory proponents.150 Likewise,
deregulation could also serve the private interests of

146

Id. If there is a monopoly, where the only two stations in a market are owned by the
same entity, and eighty percent of the audience wants to listen to a country music format
and twenty percent wants to listen to a classical music format, the entity would not want
to compete against itself. Thus, one station would have a country music format and the
other station would have a classical music format in order to reach the most possible
listeners.
147
Id. at 211. If there are only two separately owned stations in a market where eighty
percent of the audience wants to listen to a country music format and twenty percent
wants to listen to a classical music format, the two stations would have no motivation to
have a classical music format. Sharing the country music format could give each station
forty percent of the listeners in the market, compared to a maximum of twenty percent of
the listeners with a classical music format.
148
Id. at 215 (“The conclusion here is that even given perfect shiftability (the situation
that makes diversity most likely to appeal to stations) there is likely to be substantial
duplication and repetition; the number of stations required to achieve production of
relatively less popular program types is quite large.”).
149
See id. (concluding that “the great duplication of repetition of programs . . . serves
not at all to increase satisfaction”).
150
See supra notes 122–33 and accompanying text.
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broadcasters.151 Without ownership restrictions, conglomerates
can consolidate radio ownership and profit from resulting benefits
of economies of scale and scope.152
The efficiency theory proposes that larger entities “achieve
greater product efficiency through economies of scale.”153 That is,
as a company grows larger, it can consolidate its resources to
operate more efficiently than a smaller firm.154 For example, an
owner of five radio stations can consolidate its news department so
that each station only bears one-fifth of the cost. Conversely, an
entity that owns one station must bear the entire cost of its news
department or choose to eliminate it.
Deregulation of ownership restrictions and the resulting
consolidation of the radio industry would create new operational
efficiencies, including the sharing of management and production
and programming personnel, as well as clerical staff.155
Additionally, bulk discounts on services and supplies as well as
shared advertising, promotions, and technical facilities decrease
the costs of doing business.156 Proponents of deregulation argue
that these efficiencies resulting from consolidation do not solely
benefit the broadcasters.157 The profits can be passed on to the
151

For example, using one news department to bring the news to multiple stations saves
money for the owner. See also infra notes 152–63 and accompanying text.
152
An economy of scale occurs when there is “a reduction in long-run average cost as a
result of an expansion in output which leads to increasing returns to scale.” DONALD
RUTHERFORD, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 141 (Routledge 1992). An economy of scope
occurs when there is “a reduction in average cost brought about by the joint production of
two or more goods (or services) by a single firm, rather than by several firms. The
similarities of the products permit the use of the same factor inputs for the different
products.” Id.; see also infra notes 153–63 and accompanying text.
153
Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, The Game of Radiopoly: An Antitrust Perspective of
Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 490 (2000) (arguing that
broadcast ownership regulations increase the costs of doing business at a time when costsaving efficiencies may be critical to a station’s survival).
154
See id.
155
See Ekelund, supra note 118, at 158 (arguing that concentration, collusion, and
profits will rise if concentration results in long-run cost savings).
156
Id.
157
See Media Ownership: Radio Industry Before the House Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
& Transport., 108th Cong. (Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Lowry
Mays). Mays is chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Clear Channel
Worldwide. Lowry, a former investment banker, began Clear Channel Communications
with the purchase of a single station in San Antonio, Texas in 1972. ClearChannel, Lowry
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consumer through improved facilities, stronger signals, and more
expensive talent.158
Radio station owners also benefit from economies of scope.159
“Economies of scope are created when a [company] is able to
create new and innovative products due to efficiencies produced by
its expanded production.”160 For example, an owner of multiple
stations has the resources to form a “creative services team” to
share ideas and improve creative efforts, in contrast to a single
station owner who may only be able to afford one creative writer
who would not be as consistent.161
Furthermore, large radio conglomerates have more financial
capital to reinvest in local radio stations and markets than smaller
owners.162 Thus, advances in radio such as voice-tracking and new
formats arise from the consolidation of resources and can bring the
audience a better product.163 Also, larger companies are better
equipped to maintain costs of growing news departments than
smaller owners.164
III. CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
With the marketplace theory and the benefits of economies of
scale and scope in mind, Congress passed the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.165 No longer merely speculation, the marketplace
theory was being put to the test in the radio market. Since then, the
debate over radio ownership regulations has centered upon the
validity of the marketplace theory; that is, whether deregulated

Mays Biography, at http://www.clearchannel.com/company_execbio_lowry.php (last
visited Nov. 21, 2003).
158
Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays).
159
See Leeper, supra note 153, at 492.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays).
163
Another potential benefit is syndication. See infra notes 282–90 and accompanying
text.
164
Steve Knoll, Radio Station Consolidation: Good News for Owners, But What About
Listeners?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at D5.
165
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)).
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ownership restrictions have resulted in a competitive market that
promotes diversity and localism.
U.S. Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) views the deregulated
ownership restrictions as spurring harmful consolidation and anticompetitive practices by companies that control large portions of
the radio and concert industries.166 Consequently, he introduced a
bill to curb any further deregulation.167 The Competition in Radio
and Concert Industries Act of 2003 calls for, among other things,
enhanced scrutiny of further consolidation in radio.168
Furthermore, Congress continues to evaluate deregulation, as the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held
media consolidation hearings chaired by U.S. Senator John
McCain (R-Ariz.) throughout 2003.169
Meanwhile, the Telecommunications Act requires the FCC to
review its media ownership rules biennially to determine “whether
any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as a result of
competition.”170 The FCC initiated its third biennial review of its
media ownership rules in September 2002.171 On June 2, 2003, the
FCC voted to enact new rules further relaxing media ownership
restrictions: allowing television networks to acquire enough
stations to reach forty-five percent of the nation’s viewers instead
of thirty-five percent, permitting the same company to own
newspapers and broadcast stations in the same city and to own as
many as three television stations and eight radio stations in the
166

Craig Gilbert, Music Industry Consolidation Has Feingold Singing the Blues, JS
ONLINE:
MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL
SENTINEL
(Jan.
8,
2003),
at
http://www.jsonline.com/news/nat/jan03/108839.asp (Feingold said, “We must speak out
to give our airwaves back to the public.”).
167
Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act, S. 221, 108th Cong. (2003).
168
Id. § 4.
169
See Media Ownership (Radio Consolidation) Before the House Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. & Transport., 108th Cong. (July 8, 2003); Media Ownership Before the
House Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transport., 108th Cong. (May 22, 2003); Media
Ownership (Broadcast Television) Before the House Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transport., 108th Cong. (May 13, 2003); Media Ownership (Video Markets) Before the
House Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transport., 108th Cong. (May 6, 2003); Hearings,
supra note 157.
170
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111–
12 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)).
171
See FCC Press Release, supra note 18.
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same market.172 Reflecting Senator Feingold’s concerns about the
dangers of excessive deregulation, however, Congress rallied
against the FCC.173 In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit issued an order staying the enactment of the proposed
rules only one day before the rules were scheduled to take effect.174
Amidst the drama surrounding the FCC’s “aggressive agenda of
deregulation,”175 radio ownership rules were left virtually
unchanged.176
As part of the review process, the FCC adopted a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on September 12, 2002.177 In it, the FCC
affirmed its traditional goals of promoting the three principles of
“public interest”: competition, diversity, and localism in the local
172

Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Statutes of 2002
Biennial Regulatory Review, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 73) (“The Commission believes these actions are necessary . . . to protect the
Commission’s chief goals in effectively regulating broadcasting, to promote diversity,
localism, and competition.”).
173
Senator John Edwards (D-N.C.) said the FCC’s decision “betrayed the public trust.”
Eric Boehlert, Congress to Big Media: Not So Fast, Salon, at
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2003/07/23/fcc/print.html (July 23, 2003). On
June 19, 2003, the Commerce Committee passed legislation that would undo the FCC
vote, and the House Appropriations Committee voted to attach a rider to an
appropriations bill that would prohibit the FCC from implementing its ownership rules at
the cost of forfeiting its annual budget from Congress. Stephen Labaton, U.S. Court
Blocks Plan to Ease Rule on Media Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at A1. William
Safire wrote:
Here is what made this happen. Take the force of right-wingers upholding
community standards who are determined to defend local control of the public
airwaves; combine that with the force of lefties eager to maintain diversity of
opinion in local media; add in the independent voters’ mistrust of media
manipulation; then let all these people have access to their representatives by email and fax, and voila! Congress awakens to slap down the power grab.
Localism’s Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at A27.
174
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003)
(“Given the magnitude of this matter and the public’s interest in reaching the proper
resolution, a stay is warranted pending thorough and efficient judicial review.”).
175
Boehlert, supra note 173.
176
See Jennifer Lee, Left Out of the FCC Feast: Rules Are Eased for All Media Except
Radio, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at Finance 12. Perhaps Clear Channel Corporation is
to blame. The company’s rapid growth in radio and other industries “has drawn the
wrath of musicians, who accuse it of using its concert division to strong-arm musicians,
and the scrutiny of Congress, where many members contend that the company has
engaged in anti-competitive practices.” Id.
177
FCC Press Release, supra note 18.

PRINDLE FORMAT

2003]

12/9/2003 2:34 PM

RADIO CONSOLIDATION AND DIMINISHED DIVERSITY

305

media market.178
The FCC investigated whether: (1) the
marketplace provides a sufficient level of competition to protect
and advance the above policy goals; (2) current ownership rules
achieve these goals; and (3) revisions to the rules are required to
protect and advance competition, diversity, and localism in the
media market.179
A. How Consolidation Stifles Competition
Because the marketplace theory is a basis for the trend toward
deregulation, sufficient competition is an integral foundation.180
Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 intended to open
up competition, the deregulation of ownership limits has led to an
increased concentration of ownership.181
This increased
concentration resulted in anti-competitive behavior, undermining
Congress’ intent for a competitive marketplace.
The massive consolidation of the radio industry began
immediately after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.182 In the subsequent two years, about 4,000 of the nation’s
11,000 radio stations changed hands.183 In 1998, Clear Channel
Communications (“Clear Channel”) merged with Jacor
Communications for $4.4 billion in the biggest media transaction
of the year.184

178

Id.
Id.
180
See supra notes 121–49 and accompanying text.
181
Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence
from Radio Broadcasting, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1009, 1010 (2001) (noting that the increase in
concentration of ownership in the radio market was substantial and largely driven by
deregulation).
182
See infra notes 183–84 and accompanying text.
183
Christopher Parkes, Change of Tack Takes Radio into the US Media Mainstream:
Chancellor’s $1.5bn Lin Buy Highlights Operator’s Strategy, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), July 10, 1998, at 24. As of March 2002, fifty entities owned twenty or more
stations, compared to twenty-five in March 1996. Williams & Roberts, supra note 12.
184
Elizabeth A. Rathbun, Going, Going, Gone . . . Slowdown in Radio Consolidation
Offset by Broadcasting Megadeals, BRDCST. & CABLE, Feb. 15, 1999, at 33 (adding that
the second-largest deal of the year occurred when Chancellor Media Corporation bought
out Capstar Broadcasting Partners, Inc.—a radio company—for $3.9 billion).
179
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From March 1996 to March 2002, the number of radio stations
in the nation increased 5.4 percent from 10,257 to 10,807.185
During the same period, however, the number of owners decreased
33.6 percent, from 5,133 to 3,408.186 In that time, the two largest
radio chains grew from fewer than 65 stations187 to over 1,400.188
Clear Channel currently operates approximately 1,225 stations,189
up from just 36 prior to the passage of the Telecommunications
Act.190 That is an ownership increase of 3,288 percent in seven
years.
With the remarkable expansion of radio station ownership
comes a dramatic increase of listeners falling within the influence
of a limited number of entities. Four radio groups—Chancellor
Media Corporation, Clear Channel, Infinity Broadcasting Corp.
(owned by Viacom) and Capstar—control access to 63 percent of
contemporary hit radio/top 40 formats and their 41 million
listeners, as well as 56 percent of the country format and their 28
million listeners.191 In total, Clear Channel has 103.4 million
listeners, or a 27 percent nationwide listener share.192 Viacom has

185

Williams & Roberts, supra note 12, at 3.
Id. There was a cumulative decline of the average number of owners per market,
from 13.5 to 9.9. Id. at 6.
187
William Glanz, Radio-Market Consolidation Hits Sour Note, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2003, at C8 (chronicling Senator Russell D. Feingold’s efforts to secure tighter
restrictions on radio ownership).
188
Safire, supra note 1.
189
Clear Channel, Company Information, at http://www.clearchannel.com/company.php
(last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
190
Leeds, supra note 15.
191
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT
ON CURRENT ISSUES IN RADIO 3 (May 24, 2002) [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT], available
at http://www.aftra.org/resources/pr/0502/stmt524.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). The
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (“AFTRA”), the American
Federation of Musicians (“AFM”), and eight other groups delivered this statement to the
FCC and Congress. Press Release, AFTRA, Artists Group Delivers “Joint Statement on
Current Issues on Radio” to FCC and Congress (May 24, 2002), available at
http://www.aftra.org/resources/pr/0502/pr0524.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
192
FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 14, at 24. The Future of Music Coalition is
a not-for-profit organization which “seeks to educate the media, policymakers, and the
public about music/technology issues, while also bringing together diverse voices in an
effort to come up with creative solutions” to current issues. Future of Music Coalition, at
http://www.futureofmusic.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
186
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59.1 million listeners, giving them a 15.4 percent share.193 Clear
Channel had $3.25 billion in revenue in 2001, which accounted for
27.5 percent of the nationwide revenue share.194 Likewise,
Viacom had $2.081 billion of revenue for 17.6 percent of the
nationwide revenue share.195 The largest firm in each market
averages 47 percent of the market’s total radio advertising revenue,
while the two largest firms in each radio market average 74 percent
of the market’s advertising revenue.196 It pays to consolidate.
There is no doubt that the radio market has seen large-scale
concentration of ownership in a short period.197
Because
consolidation facilitates anti-competitive behavior, diversity and
localism suffer, as there are no outside forces—neither
marketplace competition nor regulation—forcing corporations to
seek out and serve the smaller audiences. A glaring example of
anti-competitive behavior enhanced by consolidation is the
continuing practice of payola, effectively shutting out small labels
and new and independent artists.198
193

FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 14, at 24.
Id. at 25.
195
Id.
196
Williams & Roberts, supra note 12, at 3. In 180 of the 285 Arbitron radio markets,
one entity controls more than forty percent of the market’s total radio advertising
revenue. In 93 of the 285 Arbitron radio markets, the top two entites control more than
eighty percent of the market’s total radio advertising revenue. Id. at 5.
197
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) and the four-firm concentration ratio are
commonly accepted measures of market concentration which both show heavy
concentration in the radio market. The HHI is “calculated by squaring the market share
of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers . . .
[taking] into account the relative size and distribution of the firms in a market . . . .
[Markets] in which the HHI is in excess of 1800 points are considered to be
concentrated.”
Department
of
Justice,
Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index,
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). Between
1993 and 1997 the average HHI across 243 major media markets increased 64.7 percent
from 1,272 to 2,096. Berry & Waldfogel, supra note 181. The four-firm concentration
ratio is calculated by combining the percentage of market revenue held by the four firms
in each market with the largest revenue. For the period March 2001 to March 2002, the
top 4 firms held 86 percent of the market revenue in the 50 largest markets, and 96
percent of the market revenue in the 100 smallest markets. Williams & Roberts, supra
note 12.
198
Payola—also called “pay for play”—refers to the practice of record labels paying
radio stations for increased exposure or promotion of a particular song or artist. See Eric
Boehlert, Pay for Play, Salon, at http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/03/14/payola
(Mar. 14, 2001). Since payola is illegal, independent record promoters have become the
194

PRINDLE FORMAT

308

12/9/2003 2:34 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:279

For a recording artist, getting commercial airplay is the “holy
grail” of the recording industry.199 Without airplay, it is virtually
impossible to sustain a career.200 Radio consolidation has made it
more difficult—and more expensive—for an artist to get radio
airplay.201 Payola is the long-time practice of exchanging money
for increased exposure or promotion of a particular song or
artist.202 Despite laws prohibiting undisclosed payments for
broadcast, legal loopholes allow payola to continue.203
Independent record promoters—called “indies”—act as “highpriced toll collector[s]” and lobbyists between record labels and
radio stations, allowing stations to be one-step removed from label
money and, thus, payment no longer falls within the technical
definition of payola.204 In return for airplay, promoters often give
the radio stations money in the form of “promotional support.”205
Since there are more songs produced than can be heard by the
listening public, record companies feel pressured to practice payola
middlemen between the labels and stations. See id. The record labels hire independent
labels, or “indies,” to promote an artist, and the indies promise stations promotional
payments. See id. Deregulation and subsequent consolidation has resulted in more
powerful independent record promoters, higher costs to record labels and artists, and the
shutting out of smaller artists and labels. See id.
199
Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Don Henley on behalf of the Recording
Artists Coalition). Henley has won six Grammy Awards and sold over 100 million
albums worldwide as a singer and songwriter, first as a member of the Eagles, and then as
a solo artist. Don Henley Biography, at http://www.wbr.com/donhenley/bioreal.html (last
visited Nov. 21, 2003).
200
See Eric Boehlert, Record Companies: Save Us From Ourselves!, Salon, at
http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2002/03/13/indie_promotion/index.html (Mar. 13,
2002) (fearing that musicians who complain about independent promoters will be kept off
radio).
201
See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley) (arguing that stations are able to
charge more money to record labels and artists, since consolidation has limited their
options).
202
Lauren J. Katunich, Comment, Time to Quit Paying the Payola Piper: Why Music
Industry Abuse Demands a Complete System Overhaul, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 643,
644 (2002) (concluding that payola laws must be updated to better reflect the economic
realities of the music industry).
203
Id. at 655–56.
204
Id. at 656. In other words, radio stations and record labels are subverting the law
simply by using middle men.
205
Id. at 658 (“The promotional budget supplied by the indie, supposedly used by the
radio station to buy T-shirts, billboard ads, and station vans, is in reality spent by the
station in any manner that it sees fit.”).
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to secure airtime.206 Although the Internet, touring, and other
alternative marketing techniques help generate sales, “mainstream
radio play is still the engine that drives the media business.”207
Radio airplay creates exposure and should help the artist, not
provide excessive benefits to the corporation. When independent
labels forgo seeking expensive radio airplay, they guarantee lower
sales and limit the ability of small labels to expand.208
The pressure on record companies increased with the loosening
of ownership restrictions by the Telecommunications Act of
1996.209 With multiple stations in multiple markets controlled by
the same company, the number of station outlets to turn to for
airplay is drastically reduced, especially if one entity were to reject
a particular artist or song.210 Consolidated radio stations have
gained leverage in negotiating programming and advertising
contracts, because they control a larger audience.211 Therefore, the
consideration sought for radio airplay has increased due to less
competition among radio stations.212 Promoters charge record
companies as much as $4,000 per song to obtain airplay for new
releases.213 Major record conglomerates put up an estimated $100
million a year, which small labels simply cannot match.214
Clear Channel, the nation’s largest radio conglomerate, holds a
27 percent nationwide listener share of 103.4 million listeners.215
They suggest that record companies that are dissatisfied with the
system discontinue the practice of making payments to

206

See id. at 645. “[R]ecord companies rely on approximately 1,000 of the largest
[commercial radio stations] to create hits and sell records. Each of these 1,000 stations
adds roughly three new songs to its playlist each week.” Boehlert, supra note 198.
207
Boehlert, supra note 198.
208
Jeff Leeds, Small Record Labels Say Radio Tunes Them Out, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2001, at Business 1 (finding that consolidation puts fewer programmers in control of
playlists, which creates fear among independent labels that prices may continue to rise).
209
See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley) (stating “the more powerful the
radio network, the greater the pressure on artists and labels to spend promotion money”).
210
Katunich, supra note 202, at 654.
211
Id. at 653–54.
212
See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley).
213
Leeds, supra note 208.
214
Id.
215
FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 192, at 24.
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independent promoters in the pursuit of airplay.216 That may not
be possible, however, if conglomerates like Clear Channel take
advantage of their size. For instance, Clear Channel has suggested
a policy of selling song identification as a form of advertising, by
making record labels pay for the identification of the song title and
artist name.217 Additionally, the company has discussed charging
record labels for airplay statistics.218
Another potential abuse of consolidation may be in the form of
an alliance between a radio conglomerate and a large independent
promotion firm.219 The resulting clout could allow the radio owner
to institute national buys for new singles at excessive prices.220
Any label or artist that does not pay could find its song out of the
rotations of some of the largest radio stations in every market.221
In its Joint Statement on Current Issues in Radio, issued May
2002, a coalition of performing artists, record labels, songwriters,
community broadcasters, and others condemned the anticompetitive practices of radio conglomerates, noting that “[d]ue to
216

See Gilbert, supra note 166 (noting that Clear Channel spokesperson Andy Levin
said any perceived homogenization on the radio has more to do with record labels
choosing which artists to promote rather than radio station programming).
217
JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 191, at 3.
218
Chuck Philips, Company Town: Clear Channel Fined Just $8,000 by FCC for
Payola Violation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at C1 (stating that “[m]eanwhile, artist
managers continue to privately complain that numerous pop acts are being pressured by
Clear Channel and other radio giants to perform without pay at radio station benefit
shows, which though providing income for local charities, also bolster ratings and
advertising revenue for broadcasters”).
219
In 2001, there were rampant rumors that Clear Channel would create a strategic
alliance with Tri State Promotions & Marketing, one of the largest independent
promotion firms in the nation. Boehlert, supra note 198 The firm has been closely
aligned with Clear Channel for years, but such an agreement would make Tri State the
exclusive promoter working with Clear Channel. Id. In April 2003, Clear Channel
announced that it will sever ties with independent promotion firms in order to distance
itself from the payola stigma. Adrian McCoy, Pay-for-Play Static Cuts Clear Channel
Indie Ties, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 26, 2003, at C6 (“In the end, the shift away
from independent promoters may be imperceptible to radio listeners.”).
220
One radio insider opined, “Labels would pay $100,000 or $200,000 to get a single
added to all the Clear Channel format stations one week. . . . And if they don’t pay, there
is no chance . . . they’re getting that song on the radio without Tri State. If it’s not on the
list, it’s not on the stations.” Id.
221
Id. (noting that if a song is not played on the radio, it will not make the record
company any money).
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sheer market power, radio station groups now have the ability to
make or break a hit song.”222 Dave Lebental, the president of
small rock label Pinch Hit Records, reflects the concerns of small
record labels as consolidation drives up promoters’ prices,
commenting, “It’s not set up for outsiders to come in. It’s not a
wide-open marketplace.”223
Radio ownership consolidation can lead to anti-competitive
behavior that reaches beyond the broadcast radio market as an
entity expands into other industries and has incentives to behave
monopolistically.224 Along with owning more radio stations than
any other company, Clear Channel is the nation’s largest live
entertainment company—after a $4.4 billion merger with SFX
Entertainment, Inc. in 2000225—with 135 American venues and a
concert-booking arm that purchases entire tours.226 The company
promotes or produces 26,000 events annually, with attendance
reaching 62 million.227 The conglomerate is also the nation’s
largest outdoor advertising company, with 776,000 billboards,
airport signs, and public transportation signs around the world.228
Thus, Clear Channel controls the talent, distribution, booking,
venues, and advertising of an entire industry.229

222

JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 191, at 3.
Leeds, supra note 208.
224
In order for an owner of concert venues and radio stations to ensure sell-outs at the
venues, the entity may threaten limited airplay for artists unless they play when and
where the entity so desires.
225
See Keri Mattox, SFX Entertainment Agrees to $4.4 Billion Merger, TIMES UNION
(Albany, N.Y.), July 28, 2000, at E1.
226
Rob Hotakainen & Jon Bream, Wrestling with Rock, Radio, and Revenue: The Rise—
and Some Say Dominance—of Clear Channel Has Led to Calls for Change, STAR
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), June 30, 2002, at 1A (noting that the 135 venues account for
seventy percent of major concert ticket sales).
227
Maureen Dezell, Is Bigger Better? In the Entertainment Business Clear Channel Is
Everywhere, and Critics Say That Is the Problem, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2002, at L1
(noting that “[s]ize matters in the entertainment industry, and by this standard alone,
Clear Channel is unparalleled”).
228
See Roy Bragg, Concert Behemoth Clear Channel Accused of Not Playing Fair, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 3, 2003, at 1A (stating that “[a] global leader in outdoor
advertising, its. . .holdings worldwide range from taxi tops in Boston, to bus stop displays
in China, to the brightest, most technically enhanced billboards in Times Square”);
Dezell, supra note 227.
229
Dezell, supra note 227.
223
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Critics worry that the company misuses its power over the
radio and music industries.230 They believe Clear Channel
“overpays for bands and buys up entire tours,” driving smaller
competitors out of business because they cannot afford to
compete.231 The public bears the cost, as concert-goers saw ticket
prices for the top 100 touring acts rise 70 percent from 1996 to
2001.232 Furthermore, industry insiders tell of advertising pricing
policies that undermine competing stations, payment deals that
skirt anti-payola laws, purchases of stations across the Mexican
border to bypass limits on domestic ownership, and strong-arming
artists to perform with Clear Channel’s concert production
division.233
Clear Channel took on tremendous debt in order to grow into a
powerful entity and is a publicly owned corporation that must
fulfill its duties to its shareholders.234 Thus, the company is
motivated to make artists tour as much as possible and fill as many
venues as possible.235 Clear Channel’s ownership consolidation
allows the company to take advantage of artists, who need radio
airplay to gain new fans and maintain old ones.236 Artists fear that
they may not get their songs played on Clear Channel radio
stations if they decide not to “play ball” with Clear Channel the
concert promoter.237 Meanwhile, fledgling and second-tier talents
suffer from lack of exposure in terms of venue and airplay.238

230

See Bragg, supra note 228.
Id.
232
See Hotakainen & Bream, supra note 226 (pointing out that ticket prices have gone
from $25.61 to $43.86).
233
Jennifer Lee, U.S. Radio Giant Faces Competition Inquiry, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb.
1, 2003, at Finance 11 (citing Congressional testimony).
234
See Dezell, supra note 227.
235
Id. (noting that “[i]t competes ruthlessly to do that”).
236
See Tim Feran, Fear of Clear: Competitors Worry Radio Industry Giant’s New Clout
Will Leave Them Out, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Dec. 16, 2001, at 1E (comparing
competitors and Clear Channel to David and Goliath).
237
Hotakainen & Brown, supra note 226.
238
Dezell, supra note 227.
231
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B. Diminishing Diversity: The Homogenization of Radio
Far from regulating ownership in the name of diversity,239 the
deregulation of ownership standards is intended to promote
programming diversity as competitive stations seek out specific
niche markets to gain the greatest audience share.240 Proponents of
deregulation contend that consolidation has resulted in more
diversity and newer formats.241 Critics charge that consolidation
has led to a homogenization in the music played on the radio.242
There are more formats, but the significance of formats as a
measure of diversity is uncertain.243
Deregulation advocates point to radio consolidation and the
corresponding increase in number of formats as proof that relaxed
ownership restrictions result in increased programming
diversity.244 According to research conducted by Bear, Stearns &
Co., the number of core formats has risen seven percent since
1996.245 Additionally, Spanish language formats have increased
by over eighty percent in the last decade.246

239

See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (upholding
regulations governing the permissibility of common ownership of a radio or television
broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community based on the
FCC’s policy of promoting diversification of mass media).
240
See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 24.
241
See Berry & Waldfogel, supra note 181, at 1018 (noting that “increases in
concentration appear to reduce the incentive to add stations and to increase variety, both
absolutely and conditional on the number of stations”).
242
See Ortner, supra note 23, at 172 (arguing that consolidation has “effectively
homogenized the programming heard across the country and stifled the diversity of
voices emanating from the airwaves”).
243
Due to significant overlapping of songs, more formats may not necessarily mean
more diversity. See infra notes 247–64 and accompanying text.
244
Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays).
245
Bear, Stearns & Co., Format Diversity: More from Less? 2 (Nov. 4, 2002)
(maintaining that the rapid consolidation of radio following the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 has created more diversity in programming), available at
http://www.nab.org/FormatDiversity (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
246
Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Edward Fritts). Fritts is the president and
chief executive officer of the National Association of Broadcasters. Id.
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Many argue, however, that formats are a poor measure of
diversity.247 Sub-classifications are misleading, considering that a
number of different classifications can mean virtually the same
thing.248 In addition to the adult contemporary format, for
example, there are hot adult contemporary, rock adult
contemporary, urban adult contemporary, mix adult contemporary,
soft adult contemporary, light adult contemporary, and others.249
Playlists, rather than formats, are more accurate evaluators of
programming diversity.250
The Future of Music Coalition report of November 18, 2002
analyzed playlists and found substantial overlap between
formats.251 In the most extreme case, there was a seventy-six
percent overlap as thirty-eight of the top fifty songs on two charts
were identical.252 This trend reveals a homogenization in the
music played on the radio.253 As conglomerates purchase more
local and independent radio stations, playlists contract and become
uniform.254
Large owners blame perceived homogenization on the record
labels’ practice of promoting a small amount of new artists each
year.255 What the public hears is often what the record industry
promotes the most.256 Furthermore, record companies fail to take
the risks necessary to sign, produce, and promote new artists.257
Record companies respond that they would be willing to
promote more artists if not deterred by the high costs of payola.258
The practice of pay for play not only pushes out smaller labels and
247

See FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 192, at 41 (charging that some stations
change the name of their format for marketing purposes, while leaving the playlist
unchanged).
248
See id. at 44.
249
Id. at 49.
250
See id. at 44.
251
Id. at 44–48.
252
Id. at 49. For the week ending August 2, 2002, the CHR/Rhythmic and Urban
formats shared thirty-eight songs out of top fifty most played. Id.
253
See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley).
254
See id.
255
Gilbert, supra note 166.
256
Id.
257
See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays).
258
See Leeds, supra note 213.
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independent artists,259 but also restricts the amount of new artists
on which large record companies take a chance.260 As a result,
there exists a homogenization of music on the airwaves.261
Despite Steiner’s theory that increased ownership
concentration on the local level would lead to a subsequent
increase in formats in order to reach more listeners, there is little
evidence that deregulation has led companies to seek out specific
niche markets.262 Detractors complain of a reduction of classical
and jazz formats from the airwaves.263 Those listeners, apparently
not sufficiently served by radio, have turned to the Internet, as
three of the eleven most-visited commercial music Web sites
consist of classical or jazz formats.264
Although a firm owning multiple stations seems to have an
incentive not to allow the individual stations to compete with each
other, this does not necessarily result in more diverse formats in an
effort to reach more listeners.265 A firm owning multiple stations
can prevent excessive intra-firm competition simply by closing
some stations.266 Furthermore, a firm interested in reaching more
listeners than any other station in the market does not have to
program formats that appeal to each group.267 Instead, the firm
259

See id.
See Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Henley).
261
See id.
262
Steiner, supra note 144, at 210.
263
JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 191, at 4 (calling for the FCC to investigate the
consolidation of radio ownership and the reduction of classical, jazz, bluegrass, and other
formats from the airwaves).
264
See Press Release, Arbitron, MUSICMATCH Is Top Non-Commercial Internet
Broadcast Network in July According to Arbitron Internet Broadcast Ratings (Aug. 19,
2003), available at http://www.arbitron.com/home/content.stm (last visited Nov. 21,
2003). In January 2003, five of the top ten were classical or jazz. Press Release,
Arbitron, Three Classical Stations Rank Within the Top Ten Channels According to
Arbitron’s
Measure
Cast
Ratings
(Jan.
23,
2003),
available
at
http://www.arbitron.com/newsroom/archive/WCR01_23_03.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2003).
265
Berry & Waldfogel, supra note 181, at 1022 (arguing that monopolistic firms act to
pre-empt entry of new firms into the marketplace by crowding a particular format with
only mildly diverse programming).
266
Id. at 1011 (“If this can be done in a way that does not attract entry, then variety is
reduced.”).
267
Id. at 1012.
260

PRINDLE FORMAT

316

12/9/2003 2:34 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:279

could program formats in ways that crowd the most popular
format, in order to deter new stations from entering the market.268
Thus, the incentive to control the entire market coupled with the
incentive to keep competitors out of the market results in formats
that are “differentiated, but not by too much.”269 A market where
monopolistic firms program in order to deter new competitors and
control the entire market illustrates a market that is noncompetitive and not sufficiently diverse to reach the niche
listeners.
C. Localism Sacrificed for Efficiency
In a Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings
adopted in 1965, the FCC said, “local residence complements the
statutory scheme and [FCC] allocation policy of licensing a large
number of stations throughout the country, in order to provide for
attention to local interests, and local ownership also generally
accords with the goal of diversifying control of broadcast
stations.”270 As deregulation of radio has turned into consolidation
of radio, however, many local stations are far away from their
parent company management.271 A station’s news and public
service programming reflects the character of the local
communities,272 and radio consolidation has sacrificed that
character in many communities.
268
Id. Recalling the examples, supra notes 146–47, if there is a monopoly, where the
only two stations in a market are owned by the same entity, and eighty percent of the
audience wants to listen to a country music format and twenty percent wants to listen to a
classical music format, the entity could crowd the country music format in order to deter
new stations from entering the market by closing any holes in the format space. Thus,
one station would have a country music format appealing to fans of Garth Brooks and
Tim McGraw and the other station would have a country music format appealing to fans
of Hank Williams and Johnny Cash, in order to reach and retain the most possible
listeners of the largest format in the market. As a result, no station would reach the niche
market of classical music listeners, and the two remaining formats would consist of
extreme overlap and little diversity.
269
Id.
270
Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
271
Clear Channel is headquartered in San Antonio, Texas and owns approximately
1,225
stations
nationwide.
ClearChannel,
Company
Profile,
at
http://www.clearchannel.com/company.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
272
Knoll, supra note 164 (reporting that many radio listeners are finding themselves
with fewer sources of local news as news staffs are consolidated).
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Successful localism demands comprehensive newscasts and
plentiful public affairs programming.273 The FCC has noted that it
is important “in a free society to prevent a concentration of control
of the sources of news and opinion.”274 But as radio station
ownership consolidates so that a single owner may control up to
eight stations in the largest markets, news staffs are being
combined.275 As a result, many listeners find themselves with
fewer sources of local news.276 In many communities, the local
radio newscast has been abandoned in favor of someone reading
news and weather from the nationwide Associated Press.277 As
one commentator put it, “There is hardly anything more juxtaposed
to localism than mass produced news.”278
Conversely, large conglomerates have the resources to support
growing news departments.279 Many smaller radio stations are
unable to maintain the costs of news departments.280 Stations that
are not taking advantage of the efficiencies of economy of scale
may end up off the air, altogether depriving communities of the
local service.281
Large conglomerates, which have more capital to reinvest in
local radio stations and markets than smaller owners, take
advantage of economies of scope to create new and innovative
products for radio.282 For example, Clear Channel has used its
resources to create a $10,000 digital automation system called
“Prophet,” which has revolutionized radio.283 The software allows
273

Howard, supra note 119, at 280 (arguing that absentee owners are motivated by
money and uninterested in preserving localism).
274
Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
275
See Knoll, supra note 164 (“In a number of large to medium-sized markets around
the country, a single owner may control from three to five stations.”).
276
Id.
277
Howard, supra note 119, at 280.
278
Id.
279
Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Fritts) (stating that “the 1996
Telecommunications Act enabled radio to better serve local audiences across the country
as well as strengthening the industry economically”).
280
See Knoll, supra note 164.
281
Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Fritts).
282
See Randy Dotinga, ‘Good Mornin’ (Your Town Here)’, Wired News, at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,54037,00.html (Aug. 6, 2002).
283
Id.
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disc jockeys to voice track their shows.284 They spend a few
minutes recording introductions and other sound bites, and a
computer merges those sounds with songs, promotional spots,
sound effects, and commercials to create the show.285
Voice-tracking creates tighter operations.286 The biggest
benefit of voice-tracking, according to proponents, is that it brings
big-city disc jockey talent to smaller markets that otherwise would
not be able to afford it.287 Programming recorded in Los Angeles
is exported to smaller markets throughout the nation as a series of
taped moments that are spliced together to sound as if the disc
jockeys were broadcasting locally.288 Producers edit segments to
create the appearance of disc jockeys taking live requests and calls
from listeners, even recording half of a conversation with which a
live, local disc jockey can interact.289 There are some drawbacks,
such as when Florida’s attorney general fined Clear Channel
$80,000 for misleading listeners into thinking that a national
contest was local, partly since the company dubbed a local disc
jockey’s voice into an interview with a winner.290
Although voice-tracking techniques and syndication may give
small market listeners otherwise unattainable disc jockeys and
morning shows, many argue that “the local part of local radio”
suffers.291 If the show is taped, a listener cannot call a favorite disc
284

Id.
Id. “Thanks to advances in audio technology and pioneering work by Clear Channel
Communications, an epidemic of digital fakery has struck the radio industry. Only the
listeners are live and local at many radio stations, and Clear Channel is gambling that
nobody will notice. Or care.” Id.
286
Id.
287
See Leeds, supra note 15. For example, listeners in small markets can hear Rick
Dees joking about their local news or Sean Valentine promoting local concerts. Id.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id. Another disadvantage of running a station on autopilot is slow response time. See
Dotinga, supra note 282. For example, on September 11, 2001, it took four hours for a
group of automated Clear Channel stations in Harrisonburg, Virginia to stop playing
music and start broadcasting news. See id. Apparently, the employees “couldn’t figure
out how to do anything because they had so few people in that building.” Id.
291
Polly Higgins & Oscar Abeyta, Tuscon Radio Making Waves: Corporate Radio
Roves In, TUCSON CITIZEN, May 3, 2002, at 1A (commenting that “your favorite morning
team with whom you take that cup of coffee or drive to work may not be as close as you
think”).
285
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jockey and make a request.292 Also, local appearances are at a
minimum, if at all.293 Moreover, the technological efficiencies
have severely affected the institution of nighttime disc jockeys.294
In San Diego, the nation’s seventeenth-largest market, only two
local after-midnight hosts remain.295
Moreover, some worry that “formats will serve the most
profitable demographics only and that syndicated programming
will become a cost-saving mainstay, prompting a decline in
localization.”296 There is no doubt that consolidation has resulted
in innovative technology aimed at streamlining operations, and that
syndication can bring otherwise unattainable popular programs to
small communities. For listeners who value news and talent with
local relevance, however, deregulation of ownership restrictions
has not served their interests.
D. Private Interests Versus Public Interests
Consolidation of radio ownership allows conglomerates to
benefit from economies of scale.297 The private economic interests
of radio owners, however, should be subordinate to the public
interest of promoting competition, diversity, and localism in the
marketplace.298 Thus, benefits to private interests should not be
gained at the expense of the public interest.
Large-scale radio owners benefit from operational efficiencies,
such as sharing management, production, and programming
personnel.299 Additionally, advertising, promotions, and technical
292

Id.
Id.
294
Id. Many stations record evening and overnight shifts, allowing voice-tracking to cut
and paste voices with songs. Id.
295
Dotinga, supra note 282.
296
Howard, supra note 119, at 280 (quoting Chuck Taylor, Westinghouse, Infinity
Merger Fuels Consolidation Concerns, BILLBOARD, July 6, 1996).
297
As a firm grows larger, it can consolidate its resources to operate more efficiently
than smaller firms. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
298
The licensee is merely a fiduciary for the public. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”); see also supra notes 85–89 and
accompanying text.
299
Ekelund, supra note 118, at 158.
293
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facilities can be combined to decrease operational costs.300
Proponents of deregulation argue that these efficiencies resulting
from consolidation are passed on to the consumer.301
According to Lowry Mays, the chairman and chief financial
officer of Clear Channel, in testimony before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Clear
Channel takes advantage of economy of scale throughout the
country, reinvesting savings into stations, improving technical
facilities, and increasing the quality of local programming.302 In
Syracuse, New York, Clear Channel saves nearly $200,000 per
year by operating its stations as a unit instead of standalone
properties.303 It has reinvested those savings in the local stations,
upgrading a transmitter, installing new studio equipment, and
increasing local news programming.304
The efficiencies found in an economy of scale are in stark
contrast to the state of radio in the early 1990s, when sixty percent
of stations were losing money.305 Competition from cable and
broadcast television helped to send AM station profits plummeting
fifty percent in 1989 and 1990, while FM station profits fell thirtythree percent.306
With consolidation and streamlining of
operations, stations have become more profitable.307
On November 18, 2002, however, the Future of Music
Coalition released a report that, among other things, purported to
dispel claims that consolidation is necessary for economic viability
of the radio industry.308 The report used “power ratio” as a type of
profitability measure, dividing a station’s revenue share by its
300

Id.
Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays).
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id.
305
Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Fritts).
306
Hearings, supra note 157 (testimony of Mays).
307
See Higgins & Abeyta, supra note 291 (“But some people worry that too much
power is being put in too few hands, and that radio listeners’ needs are being put behind
the needs of corporate profits.”).
308
FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, supra note 192. The study maintains that the rapid
consolidation of radio following the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has resulted in a
loss of localism, less competition, fewer viewpoints, and less diversity in radio
programming. Id.
301
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audience share.309 The formula revealed little relationship between
the amount of stations owned and the power ratio.310 Parent
companies owning fewer than 50 stations perform similarly to
those owning more than 100, according to the report.311 The
authors of the report note that the data ideal for analysis—radio
companies’ internal financial and operations data—is not publicly
available.312
Whether or not consolidation has led to economic efficiencies,
many argue that the FCC must weigh any potential efficiencies
against the fundamental need to promote the public interest.313
Accordingly, regardless of the theoretical validity of economic
arguments, the policy goals themselves—of ensuring competition,
diversity, and localism in the marketplace—are worth pursuing
through regulation.314 After all, they argue, the Communications
Act of 1934 created a fiduciary relationship between the licensed
radio stations and the public.315 As the Court in Red Lion
Broadcasting stated, “It is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”316
Consolidation may lead to economic benefits through the
efficiencies of economies of scale and scope. The efficiency
theory, however, seems to place the private interests of
broadcasters above the public interest. Economic efficiency that
benefits the station owners is a valid goal, as long as it is not at the
expense of the public interest. The rights of the listeners trump the
rights of the broadcasters.

309

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
311
Id.
312
Id. at 30.
313
See Letter from Mike DeWine & Herb Kohl, U.S. Senators, Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, to Michael Powell, Chairman, FCC (Jan. 28,
2003) (voicing concern about any significant relaxation in media ownership rules the
FCC might be considering), available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/issues/mediaownership/dewine_kohl.doc (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
314
See Bates & Chambers, supra note 6, at 21.
315
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 389
(1969) (upholding regulations requiring radio stations to provide time for a response to a
personal attack).
316
Id. at 390.
310
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IV. OWNERSHIP REGULATIONS ARE NEEDED TO REVIVE
COMPETITION, DIVERSITY, AND LOCALISM
Congress deregulated the radio industry with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to encourage “diversity of media
voices, vigorous economic competition” and to promote “the
public interest, convenience, and necessity.”317 Today, as the radio
industry contends with monopolistic behavior, decreased diversity,
and indifference toward localism, it becomes clear that
deregulating ownership restrictions failed to achieve the goals
stated in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.318 The current
marketplace does not provide a sufficient level of competition to
protect and advance the goals of competition, diversity, and
localism in the market.
The driving force behind deregulation of ownership restrictions
is the marketplace theory, which speculates that competition
compels radio firms to create diverse programming in order to
reach and serve various listening groups.319 The fundamental
assumption underlying the marketplace theory is the existence of
sufficient competition in the market.320 Unfortunately, this
assumption cannot be applied to the current radio marketplace,
where excessive ownership consolidation has created an anticompetitive environment.321 Insufficient competition sabotages
the marketplace theory and its promise of increased diversity and
localism.
The radio marketplace is highly concentrated, with the two
largest radio entities reaching over 160 million listeners and
pulling in over 45 percent of nationwide advertising revenue.322
This immense size and influence facilitates anti-competitive
behavior, as radio stations pressure record labels and artists to pay
for airtime and exposure.323 Although pay-for-play existed before
317

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 257, 110 Stat. 56, 77
(1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)).
318
See supra notes 165–296 and accompanying text.
319
See supra notes 121–49 and accompanying text.
320
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
321
See supra notes 180–97 and accompanying text.
322
See supra notes 192–97 and accompanying text.
323
See supra notes 198–223 and accompanying text.
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deregulation, recent massive consolidation has raised prices for
payoffs and reduced alternative options.324 Consequently, small
record labels and new and independent artists are squeezed out,
reducing the potential diversity of the airwaves.325
The largest radio owner—and frequent target of deregulation
critics—is Clear Channel, with over 1,200 stations nationwide.326
Clear Channel enjoys a 27 percent listener share of 103.4 million
listeners, while netting 27.5 percent of the nationwide advertising
revenue.327 Clear Channel is just as influential in related markets,
maintaining the status as the nation’s largest live entertainment
company and the biggest outdoor advertising company.328 Along
with Clear Channel’s size comes the incentive to use its clout to
raise revenue.329 Accordingly, industry insiders charge the
conglomerate with numerous monopolistic abuses, from driving
smaller companies out of business to strong-arming artists to
perform with the company’s promotional arm.330
In addition to nationwide radio consolidation that has led to
anti-competitive behavior, the radio marketplace has seen a
decrease in programming diversity and a forfeiture of localism.
Playlists and news are streamlined, formats overlap, and small
market stations lose their local identity.331 Moreover, due to lack
of competition in the marketplace, stations are not seeking out
specific niche markets to gain the greatest audience share.332
Rather, there is a reduction of classical and jazz formats causing
those listeners to turn to the Internet.333
Despite adversely affecting competition, diversity, and
localism, consolidation has led to valuable operational
efficiencies.334 Streamlining many departments, voice-tracking,
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334

See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208–23 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 262–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
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and syndication save money and bring smaller markets talent they
may otherwise miss.335 Furthermore, large radio entities have
more financial capital to reinvest in local stations and markets than
small owners.336 Clearly, the public interests of promoting
competition, diversity, and localism outweigh any benefits of costcutting efficiencies.337 The benefits of consolidation, however,
cannot be ignored.
Deregulation is not wrong. Many smaller stations were losing
money, and many smaller news departments were in danger of
being eliminated when the Telecommunications Act of 1996
opened the doors for large-scale consolidation.338 Operational
efficiencies can benefit both owners and listeners.339 The
marketplace theory is not wrong. In a marketplace of sufficient
competition, the public will choose what is in the public interest by
voting with their radio dials.340
The damage to the radio marketplace occurred because
Congress excessively deregulated, spoiling the opportunity to
create a marketplace of sufficient competition. Changing the
nationwide ownership cap from forty stations to unlimited was
reckless. The marketplace theory never had a chance to work, as a
few corporations with sufficient capital began to rapidly
consolidate and left the competition in their wake.341 The resulting
marketplace is devoid of sufficient competition and fails to
promote diversity and localism.
To infuse sufficient competition into the marketplace, Congress
and the FCC must consider implementing regulations limiting
ownership. Congress and the FCC must reevaluate ownership
regulations within the marketplace, balancing the public interests
of promoting competition, diversity, and localism with
consolidation efficiencies. There is a middle ground, where the
marketplace can benefit from efficiencies associated with
335
336
337
338
339
340
341

See supra notes 283–90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 279–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 313–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 305–07 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.A.
See id.
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consolidation, without sacrificing competition, diversity, and
localism. Congress and the FCC must determine whether a
national ownership limit would create competition sufficient to
give the marketplace theory a chance to work, resulting in
increased diversity and a renewed commitment to localism.
CONCLUSION
Clear Channel and other radio conglomerates may not be as
evil as they are often portrayed,342 but they certainly make
deregulation look bad. The massive consolidation of radio has
stifled competition, decreased programming diversity, and hurt
localism in many markets. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
intended to promote competition through deregulation, but it
overreached by completely eliminating the national ownership cap.
New ownership restrictions are required to create sufficient
competition in the radio marketplace and promote the public
interest.

342

“The evil intentions attributed to Clear Channel are not true at all,” declared Randy
Michaels, former chief executive officer of Clear Channel radio operations. Randy
Dotinga, Murky Water for Clear Channel, Wired News, at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,54038,00.html (Aug. 7, 2002).

